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Stevens Hits ‘Fundamental Inhumanity’ of Death Penalty; Thomas Responds

Posted Mar 9, 2009, 12:11 pm CST
By Debra Cassens Weiss

Justice John Paul Stevens decried “the fundamental inhumanity and unworkability of the death penalty” in dissenting today from the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to accept an appeal by a convicted murderer who was first sentenced to death 32 years ago.

Both Stevens and Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed dissents to the cert denial, SCOTUSblog reports. At issue is whether delayed executions violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Atlanta-based 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion (PDF) last year found no constitutional violation, noting a lack of Supreme Court precedent on the issue.

Stevens and Breyer dueled with Justice Clarence Thomas, who answered their arguments in an opinion concurring in the cert denial.

Stevens first declared his opposition to capital punishment in an opinion last year, but said he will respect court precedent on the issue.

Stevens wrote today (PDF) that condemned inmates wait an average of 13 years for execution. “To my mind, this figure underscores the fundamental inhumanity and unworkability of the death penalty as it is administered in the United States,” he said.

“The reversible error rate in capital trials is staggering. More than 30 percent of death verdicts imposed between 1973 and 2000 have been overturned, and 129 inmates sentenced to death during that time have been exonerated, often more than a decade after they were convicted.”

Justice Clarence Thomas supported the cert denial in a concurrence that said the inmate, William Lee Thompson, should not be allowed to avail himself of appellate and collateral review of his conviction and then complain about the delays. He also said the 129 inmates freed from prison were not necessarily exonerated; rather, many were the beneficiaries of the Supreme Court’s “Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”

Breyer’s dissent to the cert denial answered Thomas, saying the defendant should not be penalized for exercising his appellate rights. He also cited evidence that the petitioner was a slow learner and likely under the sway of a co-defendant; Thomas, on the other hand, cited facts showing the gruesome nature of the crime.

The case is Thompson v. McNeil.


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